

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 AF-04 EUR-08 PM-03 INR-05 CIAE-00

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O R 201000Z FEB 75  
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0272  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DOHA  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT  
AMEMBASSY SANAA  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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LIMDIS

E.O.: 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PORS, PINS, MASS, SA, UK, BA, IR, IZ, JO, KU, JU,  
QA, SA, TC, EG, LE, PK, SU, YE  
SUBJ: ADVISORY ROLES OF UK AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN PERSIAN  
GULF STATES

REF : A. STATE A-74; B. STATE 29563; C. AMMAN 1060;  
D. SANAA 378; E. ISLAMABAD 1448; F. ABU DHABI 352

SUMMARY: IDEALLY THE SAG WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE  
ALL THE MILITARY ADVISORS NEEDED BY ALL THE NEIGHBORING  
GULF STATES AND THE YAR. THIS IS OUT OF THE QUESTION, BUT --  
WHERE IT FOOTS THE BILL -- THE SAG MAY ATTEMPT TO HAVE A  
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CONTROLLING VOICE IN THE ADVISORY EFFORT. THE SAG WOULD

RATHER THERE BE A MINIMUM OF ADVISORS FROM COUNTRIES WITH ASPIRATIONS TO A POWER ROLE IN THE AREA (E.G. IRAN, EGYPT) AND WOULD PROBABLY PREFER THAT NO ONE COUNTRY DOMINATE THE ADVISORY EFFORT IN ANY COUNTRY. WE AGREE WITH THE LOGIC FOR A MAJOR JORDANIAN ADVISORY EFFORT IN THE GULF, BUT THE SAG IS COOL. IF THE GOJ DIRECT ROLE IS NOT OBVIOUS, INDIVIDUAL JORDANIAN ADVISORS WILL BE MORE WELCOME TO THE SAG. UNLESS THERE ARE EXTENSIVE PRIOR CONSULTATIONS, THE USE OF THE JORDANIAN SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION IN A "FIRE BRIGADE" CAPACITY IN THE GULF COULD BRING DOWN A VERY NEGATIVE SAG REACTION AND THE USG WOULD PROBABLY BE DIRECTLY IN THE LINE OF FIRE. END SUMMARY.

1. THE SAUDI ARABIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS FOREIGN ADVISORS IN THE GULF STATES AND IN THE YAR DEPENDS, OF COURSE, UPON THEIR NATIONALITY BUT IS IN EVERY CASE AT LEAST SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS. MUCH OF WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THESE ATTITUDES DERIVES FROM REMARKS MADE PUBLICLY AND TO US IN PRIVATE BY MINDEF AND AVIATION PRINCE SULTAN OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS. OTHERS IN THE SAG MAY HAVE DIFFERING VIEWS, BUT FOR THE PRESENT SULTAN'S VIEWS CAN BE CONSIDERED A REFLECTION OF THE GENERAL SAG POSITION.

2. IDEALLY, THE SAG WOULD LIKE TO BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE THE ARMED FORCES AND SECURITY ADVISORS REQUIRED IN ALL OF THE NEIGHBORING STATES. AS THIS IS CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE, THE SAG IS LIKELY TO ATTEMPT WHERE IT BELIEVES IT HAS SOME LEVERAGE (E.E. WHERE IT IS PAYING THE BILL) TO CONTROL THE ADVISORY EFFORT OF OTHERS. THIS HAS RECENTLY BEEN EVIDENT IN THE CASE OF THE YAR. WHILE THE ATTEMPT HAS GOTTEN NOWHERE THUS FAR, THE SAG WILL PROBABLY MAKE A NEW EFFORT WHEN IT FINALLY COMES UP WITH ITS AID PACKAGE FOR MODERNIZING THE YAR ARMED FORCES. THE SAG MIGHT ALSO ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE TRAINING OF BAHRAIN FORCES IN THE USE OF NEW WEAPONS ACQUIRED WITH SAUDI FUNDS.

3. THE SAUDIS SHARE WITH MANY OTHER STATES OF THE MIDDLE EAST A RESPECT FOR BRITISH ADVISORY ABILITIES AND A DISTRUST OF BRITISH MOTIVES. THE SAUDIS HAVE AN ABIDING SUSPICION THAT THE BRITISH HAVE USED THEIR ADVISORY POSITIONS IN THE PAST TO SECRET

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MANIPULATE TENSIONS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO FURTHER BRITISH INTERESTS. IT IS SYMPTOMATIC OF THE SAUDI ATTITUDE--IF NOT REFLECTIVE OF THE OFFICIAL VIEW-- THAT THE HEAD OF GULF AFFAIRS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TOLD US RECENTLY THAT THE REBELLION IN DHOFAR WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER LONG AGO HAD NOT THE BRITISH FOUND IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO KEEP IT DRAGGING ON. THE SAUDIS HAVE NO REGRETS AT THE DEPARTURE OF BRITISH ADVISORS FROM THE UAE AND WILL BE PLEASED TO SEE THEIR

NUMBERS DECREASE IN OMAN AS WELL. THIS AVERSION TO THE BRITISH IS PROBABLY ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THE APPARENT SAUDI COMPLACENCY AT THE IRANIAN ROLE IN OMAN.

4. SINCE IT CANNOT ITSELF PROVIDE ADVISORS, THE SAG PREFERS THAT THEY COME FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WITH NO AMBITION TO A MAJOR POWER ROLE IN THE REGION. REF C POINTED TO THIS AS A REASON FOR THE POPULARITY OF PAK ADVISORS. WE AGREE. IT IS ALSO A REASON WHY THE SAUDIS HAVE BEEN COOL TOWARDS THE EGYPTIAN ADVISORY ROLE IN THE YAR AND WHY WE ARE SURE THAT THEY WOULD BE STRONGLY NEGATIVE TOWARDS EXPANSION OF THE IRANIAN MILITARY PRESENCE NORTH FROM OMAN. (ON SEVERAL INSTANCES PRINCE SULTAN AND OTHER SAG OFFICIALS HAVE REPLIED TO QUESTIONS ABOUT GROWING IRANIAN MILITARY POWER BY INSISTING THAT THERE IS NO "POWER VACUUM" ON THE ARABIAN SIDE OF THE GULF AND NO SECURITY ROLE THERE FOR IRAN.) WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE SAG WOULD LIKE TO SEE ANY OTHER COUNTRY WHETHER OR NOT IT CAN LOGICALLY BE CONSIDERED A POTENTIAL POWER IN THE AREA BECOME THE SOLE OR DOMINANT INFLUENCE ON THE ARMED FORCES OF THE GULF STATES OR (PARTICULARLY) THE YAR. RATHER IT WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE JOB APPORTIONED AMONG A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES--PREFERABLY MUSLIM--CAPABLE OF DOING THE JOB. (INTERESTINGLY, PRINCE SULTAN ONCE MENTIONED TURKEY AMONG COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE ADVISORS TO THE YAR. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING OF THIS SINCE).

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O R 201000Z FEB 75

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0273

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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5. WE AGREE WITH THE THRUST OF REF C ARGUING FOR A MAJOR ADVISORY ROLE IN THE PENINSULA FOR JORDAN. HOWEVER, REF C IS ALSO CORRECT IN POINTING OUT SAUDI RESERVATIONS ABOUT LARGE-SCALE JORDANIAN INVOLVEMENT. IN THE COURSE OF THE JOINT SECURITY COMMISSION MEETINGS IN RIYADH LAST NOVEMBER THE U.S. SIDE BROACHED THE IDEA OF SAUDI FUNDING OF JORDANIAN ADVISORS IN THE YAR. THE REACTIONS OF BOTH PRINCES FAHAD AND SULTAN WERE NEGATIVE, THE LATTER'S QUITE FIRMLY SO. THERE IS APPARENT CONTRADICTION IN THE REPORTED SAG SUPPORT FOR AN ACTIVE JORDANIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN OMAN, BUT THIS IS A MUCH LESS SENSITIVE AREA FOR SAUDI ARABIA.

6. THIS COOLNESS TOWARDS JORDAN'S ROLE IS NOT READILY EXPLAINED  
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BUT IS PROBABLY IN PART A HANGOVER FROM THE DAYS OF DYNASTIC RIVALRY. IT MAY ALSO REFLECT JEALOUSY THAT A JORDANIAN PRESENCE MIGHT DIMINISH WHAT THE SAUDIS REGARD THE NATURAL STATE WHEREBY THE GULF STATES AND THE YAR LOOK TO THE SAG FOR LEADERSHIP IN ALL AREAS, INCLUDING SECURITY.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ACCEPTABILITY OF JORDANIAN ADVISORS IS DIRECTLY PROPORTIONAL TO THE ABSENCE OF OBVIOUS JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT. WE THINK THAT THE SAG WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY UPON THE EMPLOYMENT OF SECONDED OR RETIRED JORDANIAN OFFICERS FUNCTIONING AS INDIVIDUAL ADVISORS WORKING ALONGSIDE ADVISORS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES. AT THE OTHER EXTREME, WE SUSPECT THAT THE SAG WOULD BE HOSTILE TO THE USE OF A LARGISH JORDANIAN ARMY TEAM AS THE SOLE ADVISORS IN, FOR INSTANCE, THE FORMATION OF A MECHANIZED BATTALION OR IN A MAJOR MILITARY FIELD SUCH AS ARTILLERY.

8. THE GROWTH OF THE JORDANIAN ADVISORY ROLE IN THE GULF AN YAR IS PROBABLY INEVITABLE IN ANY CASE. IF IT GROWS RELATIVELY SLOWLY AND WITH LITTLE APPARENT DIRECT GOJ INVOLVEMENT WE THINK THAT THE SAG WILL ACCEPT AND PERHAPS EVEN WELCOME IT. WE SHOULD NOT GET INVOLVED IN PUSHING THE JORDANIANS WITH THE SAUDIS. UNDER MOST CIRCUMSTANCES THE SAUDIS WOULD BE LIKELY

TO VIEW THIS AS U.S. MEDDLING WHERE WE DO NOT HAVE A VALID INTEREST AND IT MIGHT ALSO AROUSE SUSPICIONS THAT WE ARE USING THE JORDANIANS AS OUR CHOSEN INSTRUMENTS IN THE AREA.

9. WE HAVE VERY STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE USE OF JORDANIAN FORCES IN A "FIRE BRIGADE" CAPACITY IN THE GULF AREA, THROUGH WE DO NOT EXCLUDE IT IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN SAUDI ARABIA. WE WILL DEAL WITH THIS SUBJECT IN MORE DETAIL IN OUR ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT ANY USE OF THE SPECIAL FORCES BRIGADE IN THE GULF WOULD AROUSE A VERY NEGATIVE SAUDI REACTION IF IT TOOK PLACE WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE SAG. WE DO NOT KNOW IF THE SAG IS EVEN AWARE OF THIS FORCE'S EXISTENCE BUT WOULD REGARD IT WITH SUSPICION. THE SAG BELIEVES THAT IT--IF ANYONE--HAS A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ARAB PRINCIPALITIES OF THE GULF, AND DEMONSTRATED THIS IN 1972 BY MOVING ITS NATIONAL GUARD UNITS TO THE BORDER OF QATAR WHEN THAT STATE WAS THREATENED WITH DOMESTIC INSTABILITY. MORE-SECRET

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OVER, AS THE JORDANIAN "FIRE BRIGADE" COULD PRESUMABLY NOT BE EFFECTIVE WITHOUT FAIRLY OBVIOUS USG SUPPORT, A GOOD PORTION OF ANY SAUDI IRE WOULD BE DIRECTED IN OUR DIRECTION. WE MIGHT JUDGE THE BENEFITS WORTH THIS COST, BUT WE SHOULD FACTOR IT INTO OUR CALCULATION.  
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